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pAbstract
Using information from the Amadeus dataset and the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey, we provide an empirical investigation of the industry and
firm-specific determinants of the intensive margin (i.e., within existing firms) job
creation process in eleven Central and Eastern European economies during the period
2002–2009. Our results indicate that during the years prior to the global financial crisis,
traditional industries were crucial for the net intensive margin creation of jobs in the
region but, by contrast, services firms were less vulnerable to the economic downturn.
At the firm level, small and young already existing firms and subsidiaries of multinational
corporate groups tended to register the highest employment growth rates. The
empirical results also indicate that more productive surviving firms tended to be less
vulnerable to the economic downturns in terms of employment change. The
perceived quality of the business climate by enterprises of the region is robustly
correlated with intensive margin employment growth both before and during the
recent global financial crisis. Interestingly, the best performing surviving firms are
estimated to be most negatively affected by a poor business environment. Institutional
barriers thus appear as an important factor hampering firm growth in Central and
Eastern Europe. These findings hold for the group of high-growth surviving firms
(gazelles) that disproportionately accounted for the creation of new jobs in these
economies.
JEL classification: L16; L21; L25; L51; L53
Keywords: Firm growth; Institutional barriers; Central and Eastern Europe1. Introduction
In Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries1, the structural change in economic
activities over the last two decades involved two different developments. First, after the
break-up of the former communist bloc, economic activities were reorganized into
market-based economic systems. Second, as in other middle income economies, eco-
nomic activity shifted away from agriculture and manufacturing to services, where the
average firm size was relatively small but the number of firms large (see, e.g., Pilat
et al. 2006). These structural changes had an impact on how, where and what type of
jobs were created in the region (see, e.g. Raiser and Gill 2012).
After the vast majority of CEE countries successfully reorganized their centrally
planned economies, they experienced varying degrees of success in creating productive
jobs. Different levels of market regulations and entry barriers were crucial determi-
nants explaining the differences in the economic structures across CEE countries.et al; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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macroeconomic stability and improved the quality of their business environment and
institutions were able to create the conditions for firms to flourish and to attract the
largest amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). This, in turn, contributed not only to
the structural changes in these economies, but also to the job-creation process and in-
creased the attractiveness for FDI investors (see, e.g., Bevan and Estrin 2004, Pournarakis
and Varsakelis 2004, Fabry and Zeghni 2006, Harding and Javorcik 2011, Jimenez et al.
2011, Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2012 and Tintin 2013).
The aim of this study is to understand the process of job creation at the intensive
margin (i.e., within existing firms) in CEE economies over the last decade using firm-
level data. In particular, we assess the role that differences in the institutional envi-
ronment across countries and sectors play as determinants of job creation dynamics
(in surviving firms) in the region. The importance of the institutional setting as a fac-
tor fostering firm growth has been often emphasized in the literature (see Henrekson
and Johansson 2009 or Henrekson and Johansson 2011, for two recent assessments
of the importance of institutions in the firm growth process). In particular, institu-
tions have been identified as a major determinant of the growth of enterprises during
the transition process of CEE countries (see Peng and Heath 1996). Moreover, poor
legal institutional regulations, such as corruption and financial constraints, have been
identified to affect small and medium sized enterprises most negatively (see Beck
et al. 2005).
The literature dealing with firm growth determinants in CEE countries is relatively
limited. While some studies analyze empirically the factors affecting firm growth
in countries of the region (see for example Konings 1997, Bilsen and Konings 1998,
Konings and Xavier 2002, Studena 2004 or Hake 2009), the linkage between perceived
institutional barriers and existing firm employment growth in CEE countries at the firm
level has not been explicitly dealt with hitherto in the literature. Furthermore, our con-
tribution uses for the first time data for CEE firms which cover the recent financial
crisis. Since the economic downturn induced by the financial crisis may have triggered
yet another structural change in the region, a clear understanding of the key industry
and firm-specific determinants of job creation within existing firms before and after the
crisis is important for both policy makers and entrepreneurs.
Our empirical analysis combines information from the Amadeus database (provided
by Bureau van Dijk, which contains comparable and comprehensive balance sheet and
profit and loss account data for the eleven countries under study for a time period
spanning from 2002 to 2009) with data from the World Bank’s Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which collects information on the busi-
ness environment in which the firms operate. In the CEE region, these surveys have
been conducted in the years 2002, 2005, 2007 and 2009, allowing the analysis of inten-
sive margin dynamics of job creation at the firm level in the boom years prior to the
global financial crisis as well as during the “bust” period.
Our results indicate that more productive existing firms tend to be less affected by
economic downturns and that intensive margin employment growth at the firm level is
correlated with the perceived quality of the business climate by CEE enterprises. For
the post-crisis period, our estimates show that the overall level of institutional barriers
have had a significant negative effect on employment growth in high-growth surviving
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jobs in CEE economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts on job creation in
CEE economies. Section 3 offers an econometric analysis of intensive margin job cre-
ation patterns at the firm level with the aim of isolating the effects of the institutional
setting on firm growth within existing firms. We additionally apply quantile regres-
sions to analyze how the effect of institutional barriers on employment growth
depends on the relative performance of firms. Section 4 investigates the role played by
industry and firm-specific characteristics on the likelihood of belonging to the group
of high-growth surviving firms. Such an analysis allows us to understand the nature of
the factors promoting job creation in CEE countries and informs policymakers about the
potential effects of changes in the regulatory framework on intensive margin job creation.
Section 5 concludes and offers policy conclusions based on our empirical results.
2. Job creation at the firm level and business environment perceptions in
CEE economies: the stylized facts
In order to analyze the characteristics of intensive margin job creation in the region, we
use the Amadeus database to construct a variable measuring yearly employment growth
for all available firms from CEE economies and spanning the years 2002 to 2009. This
leads to a dataset of 2,590,137 firm-year observations for the eleven economies consid-
ered2. The main advantage of this data source is that it captures not only medium and
large firms, but also some very small firms. The minimum number of employees of the
recorded firms is one worker. The data at hand, therefore, allow to accurately address the
question whether small or large surviving firms are more important net job creators.
The database, however, also has at least three notable drawbacks. First, Amadeus re-
ports poor information on market entry and exit. Consequently, our analysis of job cre-
ation is limited to the impact of certain firm and industry characteristics for surviving
firms and, thus, we focus on intensive margin job creation. Second, the quality of the
Amadeus data substantially varies across countries. The main reason for this is that
Bureau van Dijk, the commercial supplier of Amadeus, puts together firm-level data
that are provided by national data collectors, which in turn often concentrate on differ-
ent types of information. For example, for firms located in Croatia, Estonia and
Lithuania only limited financial data are provided which do not contain any informa-
tion on value added or costs of employees3. Finally, as highlighted by Klapper et al.
(2002) some of the information reported in the Amadeus database might simply be
carried over from one year to another, leading to the impression that certain variables
remained constant over time when in reality the companies just did not update the
corresponding information. In such cases, a zero growth rate of employment would not
reflect the real changes in employment but rather would be induced by data collection
issues. In our empirical analysis, we try to limit this issue by excluding all observations
where at least two of three important balance sheet items including employment, reve-
nues and total assets amount exactly to the same value over two consecutive years. We
exclude all observations with simultaneous zero growth rates for employment and reve-
nues, employment and total assets or revenues and total assets.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of total employment in 2008 to employment in 2002 derived
from the Amadeus data, as well as the same ratio for the years 2009 and 20024. On
Figure 1 Employment in 2008/2009 relative to 2002 by country, CEE countries.
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active in 2002 increased by approximately 76 percent. Many jobs created in CEE econ-
omies during the period 2002–2008 were actually lost during the 2008 global financial
crisis. In the six first years of the period considered the minimum increase in the num-
ber of workers amounted to approximately 50 percent across all countries. At the in-
tensive margin, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia were able to more
than double the number of employed workers. However, the global financial crisis in-
duced a substantial overall job loss in 2009, nearly halving the cumulative gains of the
previous period from 2002 to 2008. Interestingly, in Poland the sharp reduction of em-
ployment in active firms has been associated with a decrease in real GDP. In contrast
to all other CEE countries which experienced (substantial) negative real GDP growth
rates, Poland’s GDP grew at a rate of 1.6% (see Eurostat 2013). However, Poland’s un-
employment rate also increased after 2008, which is consistent with the firm level data
from the Amadeus database.
The average job creation rates among surviving firms also differed substantially
across industries, as can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts average employment growth
by sector and year. Prior to the financial crisis, the average intensive margin employ-
ment growth among the surveyed firms was smallest in agricultural and fishing and lar-
gest in construction and in the transport, storage and communications industries. This
is in line with more aggregated data showing that different types of service industries
also gain importance in the CEE economies. Interestingly, in 2009 only two sectors reg-
istered positive intensive margin employment growth rates – agriculture and fishing
and the other services industries. The average intensive margin job destruction rate in
2009 amounted to 4.4 percent in the construction industry alone. While existing firms
in the manufacturing sector experienced decent job creation rates from 2002 to 2008,
they were most severely affected by the 2008 global financial crisis, with an average
intensive margin job destruction rate of around 6 percent in 2009.
Figure 2 Average employment growth rate by sector and year, CEE countries: 2002–2009.
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mation about the business environment perceptions that are available at a 2-digit in-
dustry level of aggregation. The BEEPS database is collected by the World Bank and
reports detailed survey information on firms located all over the world. The average
business barriers index is based on questions regarding perceived barriers for doing
business in the categories institutional regulations, access to finance, crime, corruption,
taxation, labor regulations, infrastructure and law. The specific questions used for the
construction are reported in the Additional file 1 and the answers to each question
range from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). For the construction of the over-
all business barriers index we first average the replies to all questions for each firm and,
subsequently, construct the industry index by averaging all averages within each 2-digit
industries. This approach is necessary because the firms surveyed in the BEEPS dataset
cannot be directly linked with the firms collected in the Amadeus database. In contrast
to other data sources, such as the World Economic Outlook (WEO) data provided by
the IMF, the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators and OECD’s product market
competition indicators, the BEEPS data have some advantages for the aim of this paper.
First, the Doing Business indicators and the WEO data are only available at the coun-
try level and do not allow to link within-country variation in intensive margin employ-
ment growth to differences in institutional barriers for doing business. The OECD’s
product market competition indicators are collected at the sectorial level but are only
available for very few industries such as professional services, retail trade and energy,
transport and communications. A drawback of the product market competition indi-
cators as well as the BEEPS data is that the surveys are not conducted every year. In
our case, the BEEPS data are only available for the years 2002, 2005, 2007 and 2009
and not all included firms are surveyed in all four waves of the questionnaire. In our
econometric approach, discussed in Sections 3 and 4, we take this data limitation into
account.
Figure 3 Employment growth and perceived business barriers, 2002–2009.
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gether with average intensive margin employment growth for the countries in our sam-
ple. At the country level, Romania was perceived to be the most business unfriendly
country5. Romania, the Czech Republic, and Poland were all perceived to have had in-
stitutional obstacles to doing business and experienced below average intensive margin
employment growth rates in the observed period.
Latvia, on the other hand, was perceived as a relatively business friendly economy
and showed the highest average employment growth rates in existing firms in our
group of CEE economies. Interestingly, however, jobs in Latvia were strongly affected
by the financial crisis, while employment in Romania remained relatively stable. Estonia -
the most business amicable country between 2002 and 2009 according to this index –
however saw its intensive margin employment growth lag behind the other economies in
the region. Some countries such as Bulgaria were perceived to have relatively unfriendly
business environments, but the average job creation rates of existing firms located in these
economies were above the average of the CEE region.
Given such ambiguous empirical stylized facts, the question of whether firm-level
employment performance in existing firms differs across CEE countries with different
quality of business institutions appears warranted. With this hypothesis at hand, the
rest of the paper investigates econometrically the industry and firm-specific determi-
nants of the intensive margin job creation process in the CEE region and specifically
analyzes the role of institutional barriers to growth.
3. The empirical determinants of firm growth in CEE countries: how much do
institutional barriers matter?
In order to assess econometrically the effects of the business climate and other covari-
ates on the growth performance of surviving enterprises in CEE countries, we apply
firm growth equations in the spirit of Gibrat’s law (see, e.g., Hart 2000, Coad 2009 and
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firm and business barriers data and analyze an existing firm’s average annual employ-
ment growth rate over the time period 2002 and 2008. A separate regression analysis
solely focuses on the post-crisis year 2009. Certain characteristics of the data at hand
justify the use of this approach. First, the time dimension of the Amadeus database is
relatively poor, leading to a large number of missing observations within each year. This
implies that the number of available years differ across firms. In our regression analysis
we follow Oberhofer (2013) and account for this problem by including an additional
covariate that measures the number of observed years for the calculation of the average
annual employment growth rate6. Firm-specific data are relatively persistent over time,
inducing very low within-firm variation. Moreover, the BEEPS data are only collected
in some of the observed years, thus not allowing us to perform an analysis of the im-
pact of the perceived business barriers for intensive margin employment growth at the
annual frequency. Finally, in the literature on Gibrat’s law, the cross-sectional approach
is not unusual, since through the calculation of annual average employment growth
rates it allows to investigate medium to long-run relationships between covariates of
interest and the growth performance of existing firms.
A cross-sectional Gibrat-law type of regression can be written as (see, e.g., Geroski
2005 and Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr 2013):
gij ¼ αþ πijS0ij þ xijγ þ zjδ þ εi; ð1Þ
πij ¼ β0 þ β1Aij: ð2Þ
Equations (1) and (2) state that the intensive margin average employment growth rate
gij of firm i in industry j is a function of (log) initial firm size S0i
7 (i.e., the number of
employees in the first observed period) and other firm and industry-specific control
variables collected in xij and zj, respectively. y and δ are column vectors of parameters
to be estimated. πij captures the (conditional) speed of convergence/divergence, which
is assumed to be firm-specific and is modeled to depend on firm age Aij.
One standard result in the empirical firm growth literature states that the observed
speed of convergence declines with age. This finding would be confirmed in this appli-
cation if the estimated parameters fulfill that β0 < 0 and β1 > 0. Economically, such a re-
sult would suggest that younger and smaller firms grow faster, while old small firms
would not exhibit increased employment growth dynamics8.
In order to address the potential structural breaks in the relationships given by
equations (1) and (2) which are caused by the global financial crisis, we estimate the
model for two periods, the first one spanning the years 2002 to 2008 and the second
one for 2008–2009. In each case the specification is estimated using a cross section
of firms where the dependent variable is the intensive margin growth rate of employment
(average over 2002–2008 in the first case and for the year 2009 in the second case). The
sample captures only surviving firms, making it therefore impossible to examine exit
dynamics.
The vector zj contains industry dummy variables and business environment indica-
tors. Using the BEEPS dataset, we construct an indicator that measures the average in-
stitutional barriers within 2-digit industries and countries. The overall industry-country
specific measure for institutional barriers is based on different questions concerning
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particular, this general indicator comprises information on the degree of institutional
regulations, access to finance, crime, corruption, taxation and labor regulations. More-
over, the overall business barriers indicator also contains questions on infrastructure
and law related business restrictions. In alternative specifications, the effects of these
specific business barriers on job creation are investigated separately while we control
for all other business barriers. Accordingly, the overall institutional barriers index is al-
ways calculated without including the specific barrier considered in the specifications
where it is included. With regard to additional firm-specific controls collected in xij,
(log) firm age, (log) firm’s total factor productivity (TFP) and an indicator variable for
foreign ownership are included. TFP is estimated via the approach suggested by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), which uses a firm’s demand for intermediate inputs (such as materials)
in order to overcome the problem of simultaneity when estimating firm level production
functions9. The dummy variable for foreign ownership aims at picking up structural differ-
ences in the intensive margin growth performance between domestically controlled firms
and subsidiaries of multinational corporate groups.
Tables 1 and 2 report the corresponding estimation results for the pre-crisis period
and the year 2009, respectively. Starting with the period 2002–2008, at the firm level
and the intensive margin traditional industries were the key creators of new jobs to the
crisis. Employment growth was fastest in the construction and manufacturing indus-
tries and slowest in the service industries. When controlling for differences in firm-
characteristics (especially for firm size differentials), employment growth within existing
firms was slowest in the group of other industries, which mainly consisted of services
firms10. Across different specifications of the firm growth model, an average surviving
construction firm was estimated to grow by 3.8 (see column 1 of Table 1) to 6.1 (see e.g.,
column 6) percentage points more annually in comparison to a firm of the same size, age,
and productivity in the “other services” sector. The intensive margin figure for manufac-
turing firms varied between 3.2 and 4.1 percentage points. With the exception of the first
specification continuing agricultural and fishing firms are also estimated to growth faster
than other service firms. This quantitative effect ranges from 1.2 to 3.3 percentage points.
In a similar vein, we also estimate positive intensive margin job creation effects for firms
operating in the wholesale, retail trade, hotel and restaurants as well as the transport, stor-
age and communications industries in the majority of our alternative specifications. How-
ever, the quantitative effect seems to be larger in more traditional sectors.
At a first glance, this last result seems to be partially in contrast with macro-level evi-
dence which indicates that service firms are responsible for two-thirds of gross value
added in the CEE economies. Firms operating in the service sector were indeed import-
ant in terms of overall value added but, based on our estimates, they did not contribute
overwhelmingly to intensive margin job creation11. The number of firms that operate
in the services sector in the region was very large (around 72 percent of all sampled
firms were service providers), but these firms were relatively small. In more traditional
sectors, the average firm size was much larger and, therefore, they strongly contributed
to overall intensive margin job creation in 2002–2008. Controlling for differences in
firm-specific total factor productivity and with the exception of the construction indus-
tries, service industries were estimated to create jobs at a slower pace than firms in the
rest of the economy.
Table 1 Estimation results for annual average firm growth, 2002-2008
Variables No regulations Overall inst. Inst. regulation Access to finance Crime Corruption Tax Labor regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm characteristics
Initial size −0.053*** −0.078*** −0.079*** −0.078*** −0.078*** −0.078*** −0.079*** −0.078***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age −0.046*** −0.076*** −0.077*** −0.076*** −0.076*** −0.076*** −0.077*** −0.076***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Initial size × age 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TFP - 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
- (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign owner - 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035***
- (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Industry characteristics
Agriculture 0.004 0.032*** 0.012* 0.013* 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Mining 0.043*** - - - - - - -
(0.009) - - - - - - -
Construction 0.038*** 0.061*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.061***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Manufacturing 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.041***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Wholesale 0.006 0.015*** 0.000 0.005 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.016***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
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Table 1 Estimation results for annual average firm growth, 2002-2008 (Continued)
Transport 0.017** 0.019** 0.004 0.014** 0.020** 0.018** 0.015*** 0.020**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Overall inst.a) - −0.009 −0.031** 0.016 −0.013 0.004 0.005 −0.015
- (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013)
Inst. regulation - - 0.025*** - - - - -
- - (0.008) - - - - -
Access to finance - - - −0.027*** - - - -
- - - (0.010) - - - -
Crime - - - - 0.004 - - -
- - - - (0.009) - - -
Corruption - - - - - −0.005 - -
- - - - - (0.010) - -
Taxation - - - - - - −0.020*** -
- - - - - - (0.007)
Labor regulation - - - - - - - 0.007
- - - - - - - (0.008)
Fixed effects
Country 198.83*** 135.73*** 122.51*** 124.18*** 86.91*** 165.00*** 139.77*** 145.88***
R2 0.097 0.139 0.141 0.140 0.139 0.139 0.140
Observations 180,932 34,086 34,086 34,086 34,086 34,086 34,086 34,086
Notes: The dependent variable is the average annual employment growth rate for the period 2002–2008. Constant not reported. Clustered standard errors (at the 2-digit industry level) in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. a) In columns (3)–(8) the overall institutional barriers are calculated without including the questions on the respective specific institutional barrier investi-
gated. The coefficient for the number of observed years is not reported.
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Table 2 Estimation results for annual average firm growth in 2009
Variables No regulations Overall inst. Inst. regulation Access to finance Crime Corruption Tax Labor regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm characteristics
Initial size −0.073*** −0.075*** −0.075*** −0.075*** −0.075*** −0.075*** −0.075*** −0.075***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age −0.038*** −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.055***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Initial size × age 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TFP 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign owner - 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040***
- (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Industry characteristics
Agriculture 0.026** −0.065*** −0.055*** −0.058*** −0.062*** −0.048*** −0.059*** −0.053***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009)
Mining 0.032*** - - - - - - -
(0.013) - - - - - - -
Construction −0.035*** −0.050*** −0.040** −0.044** −0.049*** −0.031* −0.047** −0.035**
(0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
Manufacturing −0.018 −0.074*** −0.066*** −0.070*** −0.071*** −0.070*** −0.070*** −0.065***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021)
Wholesale −0.004 −0.017** −0.006 −0.012 −0.016*** −0.007 −0.013 −0.010*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
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Table 2 Estimation results for annual average firm growth in 2009 (Continued)
Transport −0.002 −0.042*** −0.034*** −0.038*** −0.042*** −0.037*** −0.042*** −0.041***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Overall inst.a) - −0.011 −0.005 −0.004 −0.014 −0.008 −0.012 −0.004
- (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.026) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
Inst. regulation - - −0.016 - - - - -
- - (0.012) - - - - -
Access to finance - - - −0.011 - - - -
- - - (0.008) - - - -
Crime - - - - 0.005 - - -
- - - - (0.020) - - -
Corruption - - - - - −0.027 - -
- - - - - (0.020) - -
Taxation - - - - - - −0.010 -
- - - - - - (0.012)
Labor regulations - - - - - - - −0.026
- - - - - - - (0.017)
Fixed effects
Country 69.04*** 67.76*** 68.37*** 67.64*** 52.62*** 82.22*** 69.19*** 98.15***
R2 0.040 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Observations 299,695 71,157 71,201 71,162 71,157 71,157 71,157 71,157
Notes: The dependent variable is the yearly employment growth rate for the period 2008–2009. Constant not reported. Clustered standard errors (at the 2-digit industry level) in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. a) In columns (3)-(8) the overall institutional barriers are calculated without including the questions on the respective specific institutional
barrier investigated.
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Gibrat’s law (see, e.g., Coad 2009 and Oberhofer 2012), the average intensive margin
employment growth rate was largest in the initially smallest firms. The empirical results
show that a one percent increase in the initial firm size (i.e., the firm size at the first ob-
served year) decreases the average annual job creation rate by 5.3 to 7.9 percentage
points. Hence, small surviving firms in CEE economies prior to the crisis tended to rap-
idly adjust their size to favorable market conditions.
At the same time, start-ups and (very) young surviving firms grew at the fastest pace.
This finding holds true for both initially small and large firms. However, it is important
to note that our data do not allow for ascertaining whether the prevailing characteristic
of fast-growing firms is age or size. Recent findings in the literature with more adequate
data for the USA (e.g., Haltiwanger et al. 2013) conclude that it is age rather than firm
size that matters, so that the job creation in surviving start-ups and young firms out-
performed the intensive margin employment growth rates of older firms12.
The employment growth performance of small old surviving firms was substantially
worse. The positive parameter estimates for the interaction effect of firm size and firm
age indicates that the speed of adjustment was slower for surviving firms with relatively
small size and relatively old age. While small firms contribute to job creation when they
are young, in later periods their number of employees tends to stabilize.
Productive firms contributed positively to intensive margin job creation. In quantita-
tive terms, a one percent increase in firm-specific total factor productivity (TFP) in-
creases average employment growth in existing firms by approximately 1.5 percentage
points. This finding is robust across all different specifications, and driven by differ-
ences in the initial level of productivity13. If more productive firms compete more suc-
cessfully than less productive firms on the domestic and the world markets, this
enables them to expand their level of production. This expansion may have also in-
creased the firms’ labor demand and, therefore, accelerated intensive margin job cre-
ation rates. Prior to the crisis, thus, labor resources appear to have efficiently reached
firms with growing productivity. The positive effect of productivity on employment
growth also indicates that efficient firms within industries were able to grow more rap-
idly than the rest. Moreover, the quantitative dimension of the effect points to the use-
fulness of creating an economic environment that stimulates productivity growth. An
existing firm that, for example, successfully increased its level of TFP by 10 percentage
points (through e.g., innovation, learning-by-doing or technology adoption) expanded
its employment on average by 15 percentage points more between 2002 and 2008.
In a similar vein, we are also able to estimate a significant and positive intensive mar-
gin job creation effect for subsidiaries of multinational enterprises. Accordingly, already
existing firms located within the CEE economies but which are owned by foreign firms
tended to grow by approximately 3.5 percentage points faster. This finding could be
either driven by cherry-picking strategies of the foreign investors or by the positive im-
pact of foreign control on firm performance.
Focusing on the results for business barriers we obtain some interesting and hetero-
geneous results. The results in column (1) of Table 1 indicates that the overall level of
institutional quality has a very small and statistically insignificant negative impact on a
firm’s intensive margin growth performance. Column (2), however, indicates that once
one distinguishes between institutional regulations and the remaining overall barriers
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tically significant. By contrast, an increase in institutional barriers for doing business
(for example from major to moderate obstacle to doing business) tends to increase job
creation by existing firms. This positive effect is of a similar magnitude as the negative
overall effect and, thus, both of them are offsetting each other in column (1). From
Table S1 in the Additional file 1 one can infer that institutional business barriers, as
defined by the survey questions used to measure it, can also be viewed as barriers for
market entry. Accordingly, the positive effect of institutional barriers is well in line with
the expectation that already active firms profit from an increase in entry costs. From
column (3) we are able to infer that access to finance is crucial for firm growth. An
increase in the difficulty to raise financial resources substantially decreases intensive
margin job creation by surviving firms located at the CEE economies14. In a similar
vein, restrictive business taxation rules correlate negatively with employment growth in
existing firms. In industries with complex tax systems, employment growth rates were
reduced by 2.0 percentage points on average (Table 1, column 7). By contrast, crime,
corruption and labor market regulations do not affect the average firm growth perform-
ance of surviving CEE firms significantly during the time span from 2002 to 200915.
It should be noted that, in addition to directly reducing the intensive margin growth
rate of employment, an unfriendly business environment is negatively associated with
firm productivity in the period 2002–2008. The parameter estimate from a bivariate
regression of TFP on the overall measure of institutional barriers is −0.2, while in
terms of growth rates, the relationship between the employment growth and the TFP
growth among the firms in our sample was positive prior to 2008, but statistically
insignificant16.
In Table 2, we report the estimation results of repeating our exercise for the crisis
year 2009. The global financial crisis is known to have affected asymmetrically firms
operating in different industries in CEE countries, with the construction and manufac-
turing industries showing the largest intensive margin job losses (see Figure 2). When
controlling for other factors and in comparison to firms operating in other industries,
surviving construction and manufacturing firms reduced their employment growth on
average by 3.1 to 7.4 percentage points more than the rest of the firms (see Table 2). In
a similar vein and with the exception of the specification without any business barriers,
agricultural and fishing firms are also substantially affected by the crisis with a relative
average intensive margin job creation rate of around −5.0 percentage points. In con-
trast, the surveyed firms operating in the services sector were the least affected by the
global recession. Overall, existing firms that operated in mining and utilities industries
tended to suffer less from the financial crisis.
During the global financial crisis, firm size and age were negatively correlated with
intensive margin job creation, while more productive firms exhibited higher employ-
ment growth rates. One percent larger and older firms showed job creation rates that
were on average approximately 7.5 and 5.4 percentage points lower than for the rest
of the surveyed firms. A one percent increase in TFP, by contrast, enabled on average
about 3.9 percentage points higher intensive margin employment growth. Moreover,
productivity differentials were more crucial for job creation among the surveyed firms
during the economic crisis than during the preceding years. Firms that are controlled
by foreign owners were also able to perform relatively well. Accordingly, the average
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exceeded that in domestically controlled firms by approximately 4.0 percentage
points.
Perceived institutional barriers and regulations do not appear to correlate with inten-
sive margin job creation in CEE economies during the financial crisis. The parameter
estimates for all different specifications and types of business barriers are negative
throughout but none of these effects is statistically significant. One potential reason for
this result is that business regulations might not affect firm growth in the short run
and, therefore, one would need data for a longer post-crisis period in order to accur-
ately estimate the overall impact of institutional regulations during periods of crises.
Another reason could be that only some specific types of firms are affected by the fi-
nancial crisis and the estimation of average effects might hide some important hetero-
geneity in the response of firms to institutional regulations.
The model given by equations (1) and (2) (as most specifications in the empirical firm
growth literature) has the implicit assumption that the effect of covariates on firm
growth does not depend on the relative performance of the firm considered. Such a
characteristic of the specification implies that we cannot infer anything about the po-
tential differences in the effect of institutional barriers on intensive margin job creation
depending on the employment growth performance of the enterprise. To give an ex-
ample, the results from Table 1 could be driven by managers of slow growing firms
blaming institutional barriers more frequently than more successful competitors lead-
ing to a potential reverse causality issue.
In order to address such a question, we use quantile regression methods, which are
able to account for differences in the model parameters across quantiles of the distribu-
tion of the intensive margin firm growth variable. Quantile regression specifications
(see Koenker and Bassett 1978, for the seminal publication providing the asymptotic
theory or Koenker and Hallock 2001, for a survey on the use of quantile regressions in
economics) aim at modeling directly conditional quantile functions, where the inde-
pendent variables are assumed to affect the quantiles of the conditional distribution of
the dependent variable.
In our modeling framework, the quantile regression specification is given by
gij ¼ αþ πijθS0ij þ xijγθ þ zjδθ þ εθi; ð3Þ
πijθ ¼ β0θ þ β1θAij; ð4Þ
where parameter vectors with a θ subindex are associated with the corresponding θ-th
quantile.17 The quantile regression estimator of the parameters of interest is obtained
by minimizing the weighted sum of absolute errors, where the weights depend on the
quantile considered, and can be interpreted as the change in the θ-th conditional
quantile of the dependent variable due to a (marginal) change in the corresponding
covariate.
The results of the quantile regression for the period 2002–2008 are presented in
Table 3 for a specification using the overall index of perceived institutional barriers18.
We report results for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th conditional percentiles of the
distribution of intensive margin job creation. The estimated parameters for the firm-
specific variables are qualitatively similar to those found in the standard regression
Table 3 Quantile regression results, 2002-2008
Variables 10th-percentile 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile 90th-percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm characteristics
Initial size −0.129*** −0.051*** −0.028*** −0.088*** −0.099***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Age −0.076*** −0.034*** −0.040*** −0.101*** −0.109***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Initial size × age 0.027*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
TFP 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign owner 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.036*** 0.045***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Industry characteristics
Agriculture 0.049** 0.029** 0.036**** 0.032* −0.026
(0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.038)
Construction 0.043*** 0.026** 0.043*** 0.067*** 0.058
(0.016) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.036)
Manufacturing 0.045*** 0.025** 0.029*** 0.041*** 0.008
(0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.035)
Wholesale 0.018 0.008 0.014** 0.017 −0.016
(0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.035)
Transport 0.015 0.008 0.018*** 0.028** −0.002
(0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.036)
Overall inst. 0.014 −0.003 −0.010** −0.021*** −0.030***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Fixed effects
Country 91.90*** 107.61*** 23.47*** 49.35*** 40.83***
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.079 0.009 0.096 0.137
Observations 34,068 34,068 34,068 34,068 34,068
Notes: The dependent variable is the average annual employment growth rate for the period 2002–2008. Quantile
regression estimates. Constant not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. The coefficient for the number of observed years
is not reported.
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tained using the linear regression model. Given the fact that intensive margin firm
growth in our sample is not evenly distributed across sectors, it is not surprising that
parameters attached to the industry dummies differ across quantiles.
The most interesting results of the quantile regression estimates are those related to the
effect of institutional barriers on intensive margin job creation. The insignificant effect
found in the linear regression model reported in Table 1 appears to be driven by the worst
performing firms. By contrast, the effect is much stronger and significant in the highest
quantiles and the size of such negative job creation effects appears to be monotonically
increasing as we move from lower to higher percentiles of the (conditional) distribution.
Figure 4 shows the parameter estimates corresponding to the variable measuring institu-
tional barriers for a finer quantile grid than that in Table 3, together with their 95%
Figure 4 Effect of institutional barriers on employment growth by quantile with bootstrap 95%
confidence intervals, 2002–2008.
Cuaresma et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 17 of 292014, 3:3
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/3confidence interval19, and confirms this conclusion. The negative effect appears significant
for quantiles above the median and the structure of the effects depicted in Figure 4 pro-
vides robust evidence concerning the fact that it is the best performing firms in terms of
intensive margin job creation that have suffered most from the institutional setting in the
CEE region. Figure 4 reveals that the most successful surviving firms are harmed in their
employment growth performance (i.e., they would have experienced even larger job cre-
ation rates) while poor performing firms are not affected by institutional regulations. This
finding contradicts the above mentioned view, that the so far obtained results are driven
by poor performing firms complaining about business barriers.
4. Institutional barriers and gazelles in central and eastern Europe
High-growth firms, usually known as gazelles in the literature, are relatively rare in the
CEE region but essential for providing new jobs in this group of countries. Arias et al.
(2013) reveals evidence that net job creation at the intensive margin in the region has
typically been led by a handful of firms, many of them young enterprises. On average,
about 10–15 percent of all firms accounted for over two-thirds of net job creation in
the Europe and Central Asia region in the years leading to the crisis, and this pattern
holds regardless of whether the entire enterprise sector is experiencing net job creation
or net job destruction20. The results of the analysis carried out hitherto reveals that the
intensive margin job creation potential of this group of high-growth firms is particu-
larly affected by institutional barriers in the region. In this section we carry out a de-
tailed analysis of how perceived institutional differences across sectors affect the
likelihood of such gazelles emerging. Given the importance of this group of high-
growth enterprises, such a step appears necessary to understand the full extent of the
effect of institutions on intensive margin job creation in CEE economies.
OECD (2009) defines gazelles as firms that are: (i) younger than 5 years; (ii) initially
employ more than 10 workers; and (iii) experienced annual employment growth rates
of (at least) 20 percent during 3 consecutive years. Given the focus of the current ana-
lysis on the distribution of high growth firms across different firm size and firm age
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ition (i.e., the 20 percent tri-annual growth performance during the time period from
2006 to 2008). In order to compare pre- and post-crisis gazelle probabilities we focus
on the years from 2006 to 2008 and 2009, respectively. With the data at hand we can
also use the time period from 2003 to 2005 for measuring gazelles. As a robustness
analysis we discuss the main findings from probit regressions for gazelles observed
from 2003 to 2005 in endnote 22. The share of high-growth firms and the share of in-
tensive margin jobs created by these are presented in Figure 5. The share of high-
growth firms relative to all surveyed firms with positive employment growth was
around 3.5 percent in the years prior to the global financial crisis. It was by far largest
in Bulgaria, where approximately 7.4 percent of all net job creating firms were gazelles.
High-growth firms were most important in Romania and Bulgaria with corresponding
intensive margin net job creation shares exceeding 12.6 percent. In addition to Hungary
and Slovakia, the role of existing high-growth firms for overall job creation was negli-
gible in the Czech Republic and Poland.
To unveil the determinants of the probability of being a gazelle and measuring the
effect of institutional barriers, standard probit regressions are estimated using our sample
of firms. The probability to be a high-growth firm is modeled as a function of the same in-
dustry and firm-specific characteristics as in the regressions presented in Section 3. The
only exception is that, in this exercise, an interaction effect of firm size with firm age is
not included21. Formally, the model is given by
Pr HGij ¼ 1
 xij; zjÞ ¼ Φ τ þ xijμþ zjλ
 
; ð5Þ
where HGij = 1 if firm i in industry j is a high-growth firm and HGij = 0 otherwise. The
vector xij includes all firm-specific characteristics, zj comprises industry-level informa-
tion; μ are λ are vectors of parameters to be estimated and Φ (·) denotes the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the normal distribution. As in the regression models inFigure 5 Share and net job creation of high-growth firms, 2006–2008.
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firm age, TFP, foreign ownership, institutional business barriers and industry dummy var-
iables. They are all measured in 2005. Given the lack of observations of high-growth
firms in Hungary and Slovakia, the specification for the boom years from 2006 to 2008
does not include country-fixed effects. The model is re-estimated to examine a firm’s
probability of belonging to the group of high-growth enterprises after the crisis, using the
same model specifications and covariates. In this case, the probability to grow with more
than 20 percent in 2009 is explained by the same covariates as in the pre-crisis period,
but measured in 2008. The perceived institutional barriers for doing business are in this
case taken from the 2009 survey and the specification controls for fixed effects at the
country level.
The results of the probit estimations can be found in Table 4 for the 2006–2008
period and in Table 5 for the 2008–2009 period. In the pre-crisis period, the probability
of being an existing high-growth firm was largest in the construction, manufacturing,
transport and communications industries. In comparison to the other services sector,
construction firms were between 2 and 7.3 percentage points more likely to grow with
more than 20 percent annually in each year from 2006 to 2008. Moreover, and again in
comparison to the other services industries sector, agricultural and fishing industries as
well as firms operating in the wholesale trade and retailing or providers of restaurant
and hotel services were also around 2 percentage points more likely to be high-growth
firms. This result again confirms our discussion from above, namely that more trad-
itional firms tend to grow faster at the intensive margin while job creation by service
firms seems to be driven by firm entry which we cannot incorporate in this analysis.
Prior to the crisis, smaller and younger continuing firms were more likely to be high-
growth firms. Among the surveyed firms, an increase in firm size or firm age by 1 percent
affected negatively the average probability to grow by more than 20 percent annually from
2006 to 2008 by 0.1 to 0.5 and 0.8 to 1.4 percentage points, respectively. The latter result
is consistent with the documented crucial role of young firms for the overall job creation
prior to the crisis. High total factor productivity was associated with a higher probability
of being a high-growth surviving firm prior to the crisis. More precisely, an increase in a
firm’s TFP by 10 percent was associated with a higher probability to be a Gazelle by about
1 to 2 percentage points. While productivity remained one critical predictor of job cre-
ation among the surveyed firms, in quantitative terms firm size and age were better pre-
dictors. Subsidiaries of multinational corporate groups are also more likely to be gazelles
with the quantitative effect being similar to the one for firm size. Again, this finding might
reflect the selection of the most successful firms by foreign owners or by superior market
strategies induced by foreign ownership.
Table 4 shows that the overall institutional barriers and regulations correlated nega-
tively with the probability of being a high-growth firm prior to the crisis. This is true
for the overall institutional regulation measure reported on column (2) and all other
overall measures that leave out the individual restriction mentioned in columns (3) to
(8). To give an example, a one-unit increase in the perceived overall business friendli-
ness by the surveyed CEE firms increased the probability for high-growth by 2.4 per-
centage points. However, Table 4 also points to the heterogeneous individual effects of
specific barriers. In line with our discussion from Section 3 an increase in the institu-
tional regulations reduces the negative effect of all other business barriers indicating
Table 4 Estimation results, probit model for the probability of being a high-growth firm, 2006-2008
Variables No regulations Overall Institutions Finance Crime Corruption Tax Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm characteristics
Initial size −0.001** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age −0.008*** −0.014*** −0.014*** −0.014*** −0.014*** −0.013*** −0.014*** −0.014***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TFP - 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign owner 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry characteristics
Agriculture 0.001 0.021*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.018*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mining 0.010* - - - - - - -
(0.005) - - - - - - -
Construction 0.020*** 0.063*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.059*** 0.063***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Manufacturing 0.006** 0.038*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.055*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wholesale 0.005 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Transport 0.012*** 0.053*** 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.060*** 0.076*** 0.049*** 0.050***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 4 Estimation results, probit model for the probability of being a high-growth firm, 2006-2008 (Continued)
Overall inst.a) - −0.023*** −0.029*** −0.016*** −0.032*** −0.052*** −0.017*** −0.014***
- (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Inst. regulation - - 0.005*** - - - - -
- - (0.001) - - - - -
Access to finance - - - −0.007*** - - - -
- - - (0.002) - - - -
Crime - - - - 0.009*** - - -
- - - - (0.003) - - -
Corruption - - - - - 0.024*** - -
- - - - - (0.002) - -
Taxation - - - - - - −0.006*** -
- - - - - - (0.001)
Labor regulations - - - - - - - −0.010***
- - - - - - - (0.001)
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.061 0.052 0.052
Observations 196,653 45,392 45,392 45,392 45,392 45,392 45,392 45,392
Notes: Constant not reported. Clustered standard errors (at the 2-digit industry level) in parenthesis. Average marginal effects reported (see, e.g., Bartus 2005) *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent levels, respectively. Wald tests for country-fixed effects not reported. a) In columns (3)–(8) the overall institutional barriers are calculated without including the questions on the respective specific
institutional barrier investigated.
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Table 5 Estimation results, probit model for the probability of being a high-growth firm, 2008-2009
Variables No regulations Overall Institutions Finance Crim Corruption Tax Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm characteristics
Initial size −0.023*** −0.043*** −0.043*** −0.043*** −0.04 *** −0.043*** −0.043*** −0.043***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age −0.029*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.03 *** −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TFP - 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003 * 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign owner 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035 * 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry characteristics
Agriculture 0.051*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.046 * 0.051*** 0.038*** 0.042***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Mining 0.025*** - - - - - - -
(0.005) - - - - - - -
Construction 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010 * 0.019*** 0.007*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Manufacturing −0.001 −0.014*** −0.015*** −0.014*** −0.00 *** −0.012*** −0.016*** −0.013***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wholesale 0.011*** −0.005** −0.007*** −0.005*** −0.00 *** −0.001 −0.007*** −0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Transport 0.015*** 0.000 −0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 5 Estimation results, probit model for the probability of being a high-growth firm, 2008-2009 (Continued)
Overall inst.a) - −0.006*** −0.009*** −0.006*** −0.013*** −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.006***
- (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inst. regulation - - −0.000 - - - - -
- - (0.001) - - - - -
Access to finance - - - −0.001 - - - -
- - - (0.001) - - - -
Crime - - - - 0.009*** - - -
- - - - (0.002) - - -
Corruption - - - - - −0.014*** - -
- - - - - (0.002) - -
Taxation - - - - - - 0.002*** -
- - - - - - (0.001) -
Labor regulations - - - - - - - −0.004***
- - - - - - - (0.001)
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Observations 299,695 79,827 79,882 79,836 79,827 79,827 79,827 79,827
Notes: Constant not reported. Clustered standard errors (at the 2-digit industry level) in parenthesis. Average marginal effects reported (see, e.g., Bartus 2005) *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent levels, respectively. Wald tests for country-fixed effects not reported. a) In columns (3)–(8) the overall institutional barriers are calculated without including the questions on the respective specific
institutional barrier investigated.
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fast. In a similar vein, crime and corruption also seems to increase the likelihood of the
presence of high-growth firms. This result might reflect perceptions of less successful
firms, whose owners might argue that their high-growth competitors profit from cor-
ruption and crime in order to be so successful.
By contrast, we are also able to estimate some negative effects of business barriers for
the probability to observe gazelles. In this regard, regulations related to the labor mar-
kets and financial restrictions correlated most negatively with the occurrence of being a
high-growth firm. In a similar vein, the tax system also seemed to be a crucial predictor
for high-growth firms22.
The results for the crisis period, presented in Table 5, indicate that firm-specific de-
terminants for high-growth firms are crucially important to explain why some existing
firms become gazelles in CEE countries. In 2009, firm size, age, productivity and for-
eign ownership were important restrictions to becoming a high growth firms. A one
percent increase in size and age reduced a firm’s probability of growing more than
20 percent by approximately 2.3 to 4.3 and 2.9 to 3.6 percentage points, on average. A
10 percent increase in TFP, by contrast, increased the probability of being a gazelle by
3 percentage points. Foreign owned surviving firms were also more likely to be gazelles
with the corresponding average marginal effect amounting to 3.5 percentage points.
These findings, once more, highlight the importance of small, young, productive and
foreign owned firms for the creation of new jobs at the intensive margin in CEE econ-
omies. Surveyed firms in manufacturing and wholesaler, retail trader, hotels and restau-
rants were most severely affected by the economic downturn and were the least likely
to be high-growth firms during the global financial crisis. In contrast, the probability of
becoming a high-growth firm among the surveyed firms in farming, fishing was posi-
tively affected by the economic crisis. Fast-growing surviving firms in these sectors,
however, comprised a very small portion of the high-growth firms in the region, given
the small size of the agricultural and fishing industries. Accordingly, the positive and
significant marginal effects reflect only a very small number of gazelles. Firms operating
in the construction sector also exhibited a relatively high probability of being fast-
growing firms. Coupled with the firm-growth results from above (i.e., that on average,
firms in this sector performed relatively poorly during the financial crisis), the regression
results suggest that intensive margin job creation during the crisis in the construction sec-
tor was mostly driven by the best performing firms. The increase in public demand for
construction activities induced by governmental investment and EU-supported programs
that aimed to mitigate the negative employment effects of the financial crisis may explain
such a result.
After 2008, some barriers for doing business are still found to be responsible for de-
pressing the likelihood of becoming a high-growth firm. A one unit decrease in the
overall institutional barriers perceived by the surveyed firms was associated with a 0.6
percentage point increase in the probability to be a high-growth firm (Table 5, column 2).
Similar qualitative and quantitative effects were obtained for corruption and labor regula-
tions. Tax related barriers for doing business and crime are found to positively affect the
high-growth probability.
To sum up, our empirical exercise reveals that the standard OLS estimations as well
as the quantile regressions and the probit models are suitable for analyzing the
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Europe. In line with the large literature on firm growth, we identify firm size, firm age,
firm productivity and foreign ownership as robust determinants of the differences in
the intensive margin job creation performance across firms. Moreover, industry-specific
characteristics such as institutional barriers are significant determinants for the cre-
ation of productive jobs within existing firms23.
5. Conclusions
Our analysis of the determinants of intensive margin firm growth in CEE economies
highlights several important firm-specific, sectorial and institutional factors that explain
the observed differences in employment growth across existing enterprises in the re-
gion. During the boom years prior to the global financial crisis, traditional industries
such as agriculture and fishing, mining, construction and manufacturing were crucial
for the intensive margin net creation of jobs in CEE economies. In contrast, while the
number of existing firms in the services sector was large, their role in creating jobs was
not outstanding. At the firm level, small and younger surviving (including start-ups)
were the most important contributors to job creation in CEE countries. In addition, the
results demonstrate that firm productivity and foreign ownership went hand in hand
with the creation of new jobs among the surveyed firms. Overall, the empirical results
confirm that, in qualitative terms, the analyzed firm characteristics (such as size, age,
TFP, foreign ownership, sectorial affiliation) affect intensive margin job creation both
during recessions and economic recoveries. They indicate that more productive firms
tend to be less vulnerable to economic downturns. Accordingly, any type of activities
that increase productivity can be expected to reduce the overall exposure of CEE econ-
omies to recessions and, therefore, should allow existing firms to compete more suc-
cessfully with international competitors.
The institutional business environment appears as a crucial correlate of employment
growth among existing firms, a finding which is also confirmed for the share of high-
growth surveyed firms, which disproportionately accounted for the intensive margin
creation of new jobs in CEE economies prior to the crisis. More specifically, based on
quantile regressions the fastest growing continuing CEE firms are estimated to be most
negatively affected by a poor business environment. Our empirical results point to the
key role of improving the quality of the overall business environment for job creation
in the CEE region. The empirical evidence suggests that improving the business cli-
mate, strengthening labor and regulatory practices, modernizing institutions, and deep-
ening access to financial advances job creation should lead to leveling the playing field
for all firms, boost overall productivity and, thus, contribute to the creation of new jobs
at the intensive margin. Given the importance of the business environment for FDI in-
flows, reducing business restrictions should in addition increase medium-run and long-
run productivity and overall competitiveness and indirectly contribute to job creation.
As highlighted in Arias et al. (2013), a sound business environment, however, seems to
be a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustained job creation.
Endnotes
1Throughout the study, the term CEE countries refers to the group of eleven coun-
tries which used to be centrally planned economies and are part of the EU as of 2013:
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/3Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
2The number of employment growth observations by country available by country is
given by the following figures. Bulgaria: 158,061, Czech Republic: 214,062, Estonia:
172,940, Croatia: 224,251, Hungary: 33,570, Lithuania: 26,443, Latvia: 29,531, Poland:
42,419, Romania: 1,606,639, Slovenia: 52,054, Slovak Republic: 30,167.
3A detailed data description for the Amadeus database is provided in Udomsaph (2013).
4Figure 1 was constructed using information for all countries in the sample with the
exception of Hungary, where the number of active firms in 2002 is too small to make
reasonable comparisons. For some countries, the number of active firms in 2002 is rela-
tively small and, therefore, this figure cannot be easily compared to aggregated develop-
ments as documented in data provided by Eurostat. This figure only aims at illustrating
the developments within our sample of firms.
5The Doing Business ranking of countries calculated from the BEEPS data closely
matches the ranking provided by the doing business indicators. Since 2012 the Doing
Business indicators include an overall “ease of doing business” rank for all countries
that are included in the database (see, e.g., World Bank 2012). Comparing the “ease of
doing business” rank with the BEEPS based index it turns out that Romania is poorly
ranked in both data sets. In a similar vein, the Baltic States are among the most
business-friendly CEE economies in both sources. However, Lithuania forms a notable
exception because it is highly ranked in the doing business indicators but among the
group of more business-unfriendly economies when looking at the BEEPS data. The
main reason for this is that the BEEPS data end in 2009 while the “ease of doing busi-
ness” ranking is only available since 2012. When looking at the Doing Business indica-
tors for Lithuania over time, it turns out that the business environment substantially
improved since 2009.
6The coefficient for the number of observed years does not have a clear economic inter-
pretation and, therefore, these estimates are not reported in our regressions explaining the
average annual employment growth rate but are available from the authors upon request.
7The importance of firm size a predictor of job creation is debated extensively in the
literature. Davidsson et al. (1998) and Neumark et al. (2011) show that small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) tend to be the most important contributors to net
job creation. By contrast, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) highlight the important role of busi-
ness start-ups and young firms for job creation in the USA. Huber et al. (2012) docu-
ment that in Austria large firms (irrespective of their age) positively contribute to (net)
job creation, while in small firms more jobs are destroyed than created.
8However, as stressed by Haltiwanger et al. (2013), disentangling the role of firm size
vis-à-vis age requires more comprehensive data than available for this paper. In particu-
lar, census data would allow for the proper estimation of employment shares and haz-
ard rates of non-surviving firms.
9The estimation results for models which include TFP as an additional control are based
on a subset of eight economies. The calculation of TFP using the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) approach requires data on value added (or sales), inputs (i.e., labor and capital) and
intermediate inputs (such as material costs). Unfortunately, the data at hand do not contain
such information for Croatia, Estonia and Lithuania, which are thus not included in the esti-
mation sample for models with TFP as a covariate.
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relative to the omitted group of firms, which in our case refers to firms operating in
other services industries.
11It is worth noting that this finding strictly applies to the surveyed surviving firms.
If entry and exit dynamics systematically differ between traditional industries and
services providers, this result might be reversed. For this reason, it would be crucial
to reexamine the job creation analysis using census data that allow us to account for
firm entry and exit.
12However, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Huber et al. (2012) also document that
young firms exhibit an increased exit hazard. Accordingly, an overall assessment of the
contribution of young firms to overall job creation would require census data that also
contain information on market entry and exit.
13In fact, when replacing average firm-specific TFP by its initial value the correspond-
ing marginal effect amounts to 1.4 percentage points.
14This finding is in line with the previous work on the impact of institutional barriers
on firm growth which identified financial constraints as the most crucial obstacle to
growth (see, e.g., Beck et al. 2005 and Ayyagari et al. 2008).
15In order to check the robustness of the results reported in Table 1 we also esti-
mated alternative specifications where we additionally include a dummy variable taking
on the value of one only for firms located in Bulgaria, Romania or Croatia and add-
itionally interact this dummy with all institutional variables reported in columns (2) to
(8). These three countries were the last to join the EU and, thus, might lack behind in
terms of institutional compliance with EU rules. In these generalized specifications, the
dummy variable for firms located in these three countries is statistically insignificant
throughout. Focusing on the interaction of this dummy variable with the institutional
barriers for doing business we only identify a significant and negative parameter esti-
mate for financial barriers, indicating that financial restrictions affect firms located in
these three countries most severely.
16This result is in contrast to recent empirical studies that find a negative relationship
between TFP growth and employment growth over time (see, e.g., De Michelis et al.
2013). There are several reasons for this finding. First, the results presented here are
based on firm-level econometric TFP estimates, whereas industry and country studies
typically rely on TFP measures based on growth accounting (see, e.g., De Michelis et al.
2013). Accordingly, one avenue for future research could include a systematic compari-
son of micro- and macro-based TFP measures. Second, in contrast to De Michelis et al.
(2013), the sample in this analysis covers only emerging markets.
17Some recent applications of quantile regression methods for analyzing firm growth
include e.g., Coad and Rao (2008, 2010), Hölzl (2009), Goedhuys, M. and Sleuwaegen,
L. (2010) and Reichstein et al. (2010).
18Due to the disruption created by the global financial crisis in the growth pattern of
firms in the region, the 2002–2008 period appears more suited to understand the differen-
tial role of institutional barriers as a determinant of job creation across enterprises which
is studied using the quantile regression exercise. We also performed similar regressions
for the 2008–2009 period, but no systematic pattern in the differences across percentiles
emerged. The results of this exercise are available from the authors upon request.
19The confidence intervals are computed using 100 bootstrap replications.
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/320This finding is consistent with the recent literature on the role of high growth firms
for job creation. Henrekson and Johansson (2010), for example, provide a meta-study
on the impact of gazelles for overall job creation and confirm the view that this group
of firms accounts for the vast majority of newly created firms.
21Given the non-linear functional form of the probit model, the marginal firm size
and firm age effects are already firm-specific, making an interaction effect unnecessary.
22One could alternatively use the years 2003 to 2005 in order to investigate the relation-
ship between firm and industry-specific characteristics and the probability to be a gazelle.
In qualitative terms, and with regard to the specific barriers for doing business, we obtain
similar results when construction gazelles based on the years 2003 to 2005. Institutional
regulations and crime increase the likelihood of being a high-growth firm, while limited
access to finance and labor market regulations are harmful for gazelles. With regard to the
overall level of institutional barriers for doing business, taxation and crime, the estimated
marginal effects deviate from the ones for 2005 to 2008, indicating that the effect of insti-
tutional barriers might also change over time. The full set of results including the other
firm and industry-specific controls are available from the authors upon request.
23One important drawback of this analysis, however, is related to the quality of the
data at hand. A comprehensive analysis of the key firm and industry-specific determi-
nants of job creation would require high-quality data on firm entry and exit as typically
included in census data which are year unfortunately not publicly available.
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